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COMMENT

Leave No Soldier Behind? The Legality of the
Bowe Bergdahl Prisoner Swap
STEVEN M. MAFFUCCI†
INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2014, President Obama announced the
recovery of the lone American prisoner of war from the
Afghan conflict, U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.1 This
seemingly momentous occasion, however, was quickly
shrouded in controversy.2 Most notably, there were
assertions from members of Bergdahl’s unit that he had
deserted, and that fellow soldiers had needlessly died in the
search following Bergdahl’s disappearance.3 There were
complaints that the cost associated with recovering
Bergdahl, particularly the five Taliban prisoners for whom
Bergdahl was exchanged, was too high, and that the Obama
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, SUNY Buffalo Law School. Thanks to the
dedicated associates and editors of the Buffalo Law Review for their insightful
suggestions and support.
1. Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, Bowe Bergdahl, American Soldier, Freed
by Taliban in Prisoner Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/01/us/bowe-bergdahl-american-soldier-is-freed-by-taliban.
html?_r=0.
2. Tom Hamburger & Kevin Sieff, Joy About Bergdahl Release Gives Way to
Questions, WASH. POST (June 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/hagel-discusses-details-of-us-operation-to-exchange-talibandetainees-for-captive-soldier/2014/06/01/551c21f8-e95f-11e3-a86b362fd5443d19_story.html.
3. Eric Schmitt et al., Bowe Bergdahl’s Vanishing Before Capture Angered His
Unit, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/ussoldier-srgt-bowe-bergdahl-of-idaho-pow-vanished-angered-his-unit.html?_r=0.
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Administration had violated a central foreign policy directive
to not negotiate with terrorists.4 Above all, however,
members of Congress argued that the Obama Administration
had broken the law by failing to notify Congress thirty days
before the release of the Taliban prisoners, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for 2014.5
This claim by members of Congress raises a novel
question: Does the President have exclusive authority to
secure the release of U.S. service members taken captive
during combat operations in a foreign country? This
Comment evaluates two prominent legal theories, one
statutory and the other constitutional, proffered by the
Obama Administration in response to its critics. This
Comment concludes that the Administration’s theories fail to
provide definitive authority for the President’s exchange for
Bergdahl. In light of that conclusion, this Comment argues
that policy concerns, most importantly the military ethos to
leave no soldier behind, necessitate that Congress and the
judiciary recognize exclusive authority for the executive
branch in this area.
This Comment will proceed as follows: Part I will present
the available information concerning the circumstances
surrounding the exchange for Bergdahl. Part II explains the
relevant provisions of the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2014 and outlines the legal theories put forth by the
Obama Administration in defense of its action. Part III will
evaluate the efficacy of the Administration’s theories. Part IV
discusses the important policy concerns that support
recognizing unilateral authority for the executive branch in
securing the release of U.S. service members taken captive
during combat operations in a foreign country.

4. Hamburger & Sieff, supra note 2.
5. Id.; see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 672 (2013).
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I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE EXCHANGE
Sergeant Bergdahl6 left his unit’s outpost in Paktika
Province, Afghanistan sometime after midnight on June 30,
2009.7 A frantic search for Bergdahl followed, and resources
would continue to be diverted to the search for ninety days
after his disappearance without success.8 Following the failed
search, direct talks between the United States and the
Taliban over the release of Bergdahl began in November 2010
in Munich but failed to progress for a variety of reasons.9
Direct talks soon ended and, instead, the two sides began a
negotiation process using intermediaries starting in early
2012.10 The government of Qatar was the primary
intermediary during this process and would prove pivotal in
reaching a final agreement.11
From the start, the central piece of any deal between the
two sides involved an exchange for five Taliban detainees
held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.12
Though the deal was far from complete, the Obama
Administration briefed congressional leaders in late 2011
and early 2012 of this potential exchange, but the plan was
met with strong concerns.13 Despite these views, the
6. Bergdahl was actually a Private First Class at this time and was promoted
while in captivity. See Schmitt et al., supra note 3.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes, Behind Bowe Bergdahl’s Release, A
Secret Deal that Took Three Years, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-bergdahls-release-a-secret-deal-that-tookthree-years-1401673547.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Deal to Free Bowe Bergdahl Puts
Obama on Defensive, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/04/world/prisoner-deal-puts-president-on-defensive.html; see also Press
Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the House, Statement on Congressional
Concerns
Raised
About
Prisoner
Exchange
(June
3,
2014),
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-statement-congressionalconcerns-raised-about-prisoner-exchange [hereinafter Press Release] (“More than
two years ago, Members of Congress were briefed on the possibility of such an
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Administration continued the negotiation process to secure
Bergdahl’s release. Although talks bogged down in late 2012,
the potential for an agreement gained promise in September
2013 when the Taliban sent a message through the Qataris
that they were ready to re-engage in negotiations.14 Following
that message, a proof of life video sent by the Taliban to the
United States government in January 2014 sparked a sense
of urgency within the Obama Administration, as Bergdahl
appeared to be in severely declining health.15 Over the next
few months, meetings between U.S. officials and the Taliban
through Qatari intermediaries produced the framework for
the agreement, and terms of the deal came together a few
days before the exchange took place.16
Although
the
Administration
had
previously
acknowledged the need to inform Congress prior to any
exchange involving Guantanamo detainees,17 congressional
leaders were not notified of the Bergdahl swap until the day
of the exchange.18 Accordingly, after United States Special
Forces confirmed that Bergdahl was in hand, guards at
Guantanamo simply transferred the five former Taliban

exchange, and the chairmen at the time and I raised serious questions to the
administration.”).
14. Entous & Barnes, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law: General International and
U.S. Foreign Relations Law: United States Negotiates Prisoner Exchange to
Secure Release of U.S. Soldier Held in Afghanistan, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 519
(2014).
18. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE—COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 3 (2014)
(noting that the Secretary of Defense provided written notice on May 31, 2014 to
the appropriate congressional committees). However, there is some dispute as to
when and how notice was provided. See id. at 4; Burgess Everett & John
Bresnahan, Hill Leaders Didn’t Know of Swap, POLITICO (June 3, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/harry-reid-bowe-bergdahl-briefedprisonerdeal-white-house-107373.
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commanders19 to the team from Qatar.20 Immediately
following the exchange, several members of Congress
expressed their anger at not having been informed prior to
the trade.21 Chief among the concerns raised was that the
Obama Administration had broken the law by failing to
notify Congress thirty days prior to releasing any detainee
from Guantanamo as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2014.22
II. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION’S POSITION
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 (“2014
NDAA”) is an appropriations bill that authorizes funding for
the Department of Defense.23 Beginning in 2011, this bill
became a vehicle to restrict the President’s ability to transfer
detainees out of Guantanamo Bay.24 In 2014, Congress eased
some of the restrictions on transferring detainees to foreign
countries; however, the remaining restrictions form the basis
of the charge that the Obama Administration broke the law.
Specifically, the 2014 NDAA authorizes the Secretary of
Defense “to transfer or release any individual detained at
Guantanamo to the individual’s country of origin, or any
other foreign country” provided that certain conditions are
19. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1. The detainees were Mohammed Nabi
Omari, Mullah Norullah Noori, Mullah Mohammed Fazl, Abdul Haq Wasiq, and
Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa. Id. For a brief description of each, see The Gitmo
Detainees Swapped for Bergdahl: Who Are They?, CNN (May 31, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/31/us/bergdahl-transferred-guantanamo-detainees.
20. Entous & Barnes, supra note 9.
21. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1.
22. See id. Notably, two other laws may also have been implicated here, Section
8111 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act as well as the AntiDeficiency Act. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 1.
Because violations of each of these acts are dependent on a violation of the NDAA,
this Comment does not expressly address them.
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 11366, 127 Stat. 672 (2013).
24. See David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and
Political Clash Over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV.
179, 203 (2012) (noting that the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act was the
“final nail in the coffin” of President Obama’s plan to close Guantanamo).
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met.25 First, section 1035(b) requires that the Secretary of
Defense ensure that steps have been taken to “substantially
mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or reengaging
in any terrorist or hostile activity that threatens the United
States or United States persons or interests” and that “the
transfer is in the national security interest of the United
States.”26 Although some members of Congress have
questioned the adequacy of the security measures taken, 27
the Administration has largely not been accused of violating
this section. The section of the 2014 NDAA that is regularly
noted by critics of the Bergdahl swap, section 1035(d), reads
as follows: “The Secretary of Defense shall notify the
appropriate committees of Congress of a determination of the
Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days
before the transfer or release of the individual under such
subsection.”28
As in previous years, President Obama signed the 2014
NDAA into law accompanied by a signing statement that
addressed several concerns about its restrictions on
Guantanamo detainees.29 In particular, President Obama
noted that section 1035 “in certain circumstances, would
violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The
25. National Defense Authorization Act § 1035(a).
26. Id. § 1035(b)(1)-(2).
27. Brian Knowlton, Administration Defends Swap With Taliban to Free U.S.
Soldier, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/
us/politics/bowe-bergdahl.html.
28. National Defense Authorization Act § 1035(d).
The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— (A) the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
Id. § 1035(e).
29. Notably, President Obama did not raise constitutional issues with the
restrictions on the transfer and release of Guantanamo detainees until his signing
statement accompanying the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, and at
least one commentator believes that this change in attitude was the result of
ongoing negotiations to trade for Sgt. Bergdahl. Frakt, supra note 24, at 244.
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executive branch must have the flexibility, among other
things, to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with foreign
countries regarding the circumstances of detainee
transfers.”30 He went on to assert that, in circumstances
where section 1035 violates separation of powers principles,
“my Administration will implement [section 1035] in a
manner that avoids the constitutional conflict.”31
Presidents have used signing statements throughout
history as a way to offer their interpretations of legislation
they are signing into law,32 and the President’s signing
statement here provides the basis for the Administration’s
defense of the Bergdahl swap. Although different members of
the Administration have given various rationales for failing
to notify Congress, the Administration clearly articulated its
stance in a response to a Government Accountability Office
Report that concluded a violation of law had occurred. 33 The
Administration’s defense is best understood in terms of two
distinct legal theories, one statutory and the other
constitutional.34 The statutory theory, heretofore the “implied
30. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 876, at 1 (Dec. 26, 2013).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Neal R. Sonnett, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 6
(2006).
33. See Benjamin Wittes, Administration Response to GAO Report on Berdahl,
LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
administration-response-gao-report-bergdahl (follow “this document” hyperlink
for a cloud version of the Administration Response).
34. The Administration also provides another statutory explanation,
specifically, that its failure to notify Congress did not make its action “unlawful”
under the National Defense Authorization Act. Id. The GAO Report convincingly
finds this theory unpersuasive and, therefore, this Comment does not address it.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4. A third statutory
theory, articulated by Ohio State Law Professor Peter M. Shane, observes that
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan and the
Hostage Act may give the President the authority needed for the exchange, and
that the 30-day notice requirement in the 2014 NDAA could not, by implication,
repeal the statutory authority already given to the President by those acts. Peter
M. Shane, The Non-Constitutional Non-Crisis, SLATE (June 5, 2014, 4:41 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/06/stop_sayi
ng_that_the_exchange_of_prisoners_for_bergdahl_was_illegal_the.html.
Although similar to the Administration’s implied exception argument, this
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exception” theory, construes the section 1035(d) 30-day
notice requirement as being inapplicable to circumstances
where the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee would secure
the release of a captive U.S. soldier and the Secretary of
Defense determines that providing the requisite notice to
Congress could endanger the soldier’s life.35 The
constitutional theory, heretofore the “constitutional override”
theory, asserts that, even if the 30-day notice requirement
applies in situations such as the Bergdahl swap, it is
unconstitutional as applied to those circumstances because
the notice requirement impinges on the President’s
constitutional mandate to protect the lives of American
citizens and soldiers.36
III. DID THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION BREAK THE LAW?
A. The Implied Exception Theory
The idea that the Bergdahl swap is excepted from the 30day notice requirement presents a question of statutory
interpretation. Immediately following the exchange, the
Obama Administration consistently noted that a primary
reason for ignoring the notice requirement was because they
were concerned with Bergdahl’s health and that any leak of
the deal could cause the Taliban to withdraw.37 These
concerns form the foundation of the Administration’s
assertion that the notice requirement did not apply in this
circumstance. In particular, the Administration noted:
delaying the transfer in order to provide the 30-day notice would
interfere with the Executive’s performance of two related functions
that the Constitution assigns to the President: protecting the lives
of Americans abroad and protecting U.S. soldiers. Because such
interference would significantly alter the balance between
Comment does not address this theory as it was not expressly articulated by the
Administration.
35. See Wittes, supra note 33; see also E-mail from the NSC Press Office, to
Caitlin Hayden, NSC Spokesperson, National Security Council, (June 3, 2014,
1:27 PM), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1180482-nsc-statement-on30-day-transfer-notice-law.html.
36. See National Security Council, supra note 35; Wittes, supra note 33.
37. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1.
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Congress and the President, and could even raise constitutional
concerns, we believe it is fair to conclude that Congress did not
intend that the Administration would be barred from taking the
action it did in these circumstances.38

In making this argument, the Administration relied on
the “clear statement” principle of statutory construction. 39
Clear statement rules have been used by the Supreme Court
to protect important constitutional principles in a number of
contexts.40 In general, these rules require Congress to clearly
announce its intention to intrude on some constitutional
value, such as disrupting the constitutional balance between
the states and federal government or between the branches
of the federal government.41 This principle allows the Court
to avoid tackling a constitutional question head-on.42
Accordingly, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of
a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.”43
Here, the Obama Administration argues that Congress
did not make its intent clear on whether the notice
requirement was meant to intrude on the President’s
constitutionally assigned authority to protect U.S. civilians
and soldiers (“power to protect”). Therefore, because “the
notice requirement does not in its terms apply to a timesensitive prisoner exchange designed to save the life of a U.S.
soldier,” a court would apply the clear statement rule and
read an implied exception into the requirement.44 On its face,
38. National Security Council, supra note 35.
39. See Wittes, supra note 33 (quoting Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
40. See Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of
Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 172024 (2013); see also John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age
of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 771-72 (1995).
41. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 40; Nagle, supra note 40.
42. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 40; Nagle, supra note 40.
43. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1998).
44. See Wittes, supra note 33.
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the Administration’s rationale appears sound. However, a
closer look at this principle of statutory construction leads to
the conclusion that this analysis is far from certain.
Much of the scholarship on the issue of clear statement
rules demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s use of these
rules is not all that clear.45 Notably, some clear statement
rules are stronger than others.46 For example, the clear
statement rule that governs statutory interpretation
questions involving the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity is widely considered the strongest articulation of
these rules.47 On the other hand, a clear statement rule
“against congressional curtailment of the judiciary’s
‘inherent powers’” is viewed as less strong.48 In order to accept
the Administration’s application of the clear statement
principle, one would have to believe that in cases where the
Executive’s power to protect is potentially implicated, the
Court would require an “unmistakably clear” statement that
Congress intended to restrict this power.49 In other words, it
would require the strongest form of the clear statement
construct.
There is some reason to believe that this is an accurate
formulation of the issue. In Department of the Navy v. Egan,
the Supreme Court recognized that “unless Congress
specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive
in military and national security affairs.”50 Such strong
language can be read as articulating a clear statement rule
against congressional interference with presidential
45. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 771-73; see also Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 121215 (2006).
46. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 772-73.
47. See id. at 771-73; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985) (“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute.”).
48. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 325 (1994)
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)).
49. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
50. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
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authority over foreign affairs and national security that is
equivalent to that of the “[s]uper-strong” rule against
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.51 Since the Bergdahl
exchange may fairly be considered an exercise of the
President’s authority over foreign affairs and national
security, the Administration may be correct in asserting that
Congress had to note specifically that that 30-day notice
requirement covers situations that implicate the President’s
power to protect.
On the other hand, it can be argued that interpretation
of this statute under any clear statement principle is
unwarranted. The point of such a statutory construction tool
is to maintain the status quo in the face of an ambiguous
statute.52 In other words, if a statute is unambiguous and,
consequently, has no plausible alternative meaning, then
there is nothing for the clear statement rule to engage. Here,
the statute is not ambiguous as it pertains to restricting the
President’s ability to release detainees from Guantanamo.
The language of section 1035(d) of the 2014 NDAA is
unequivocal—“[t]he Secretary of Defense shall notify the
appropriate committees of Congress . . . not later than 30
days before the transfer or release of the individual.”53
Therefore, the plain language of the statute leaves no
understanding of Congress’s intent other than that the notice
requirement applies in all situations concerning the release
of Guantanamo prisoners—regardless of any independent
authority the President may have over wartime detainees in
exercising his power to protect. As such, it is unnecessary to
interpret the statute under the lens of a clear statement rule.
The plain text of the statute further disputes any
argument for an implied exception under a clear statement
rule when one considers that there are exceptions throughout
the statute in consideration of time sensitive issues.54 “When
Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow
51. ESKRIDGE, supra note 48, at 325-26.
52. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 802-03.
53. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 11366, § 1035(d), 127 Stat. 672, 853 (2013) (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., id. § 1041(a)(1).
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that courts have authority to create others. The proper
inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of
exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set
forth.”55 Therefore, combined with the absence of any
ambiguity in the statute’s terms, and contrary to the
Administration’s argument, any exception to the notice
requirement, including that of a time-sensitive prisoner
exchange, would actually need to be express. This argument
is buttressed by the fact that Congress was notified of a
possible swap for Bergdahl as early as late 2011, and
congressional leaders expressed concern at having to release
the five Taliban detainees as part of the deal.56 As a result,
Congress understood that there was a potential exchange of
Guantanamo detainees for an American prisoner of war prior
to writing the 2014 NDAA and, therefore, could have
incorporated this exception when it wrote the bill. Whether
they considered this in drafting the provisions for section
1035 is certainly debatable, however, it is a difficult
argument to make.
In sum, for the Administration’s implied exception theory
to hold true, the 30-day notice requirement must be subject
to the strongest form of the clear statement construct.
Although such construction cannot be ruled out entirely,
several factors weigh heavily against it. In particular, the
statute unambiguously restricts the authority that the
executive branch has over the release of Guantanamo
detainees without exception. Such language makes it
difficult to get to the clear statement principle since where a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of its
language controls.57 Furthermore, when placing the statute
in the context of what Congress knew when it wrote the bill,
the Administration’s use of the implied exception reasoning
appears especially weak. Therefore, while the Supreme
Court’s uncertain use of clear statement rules leaves open the
possibility for the implied exception theory to stand, the
Administration’s first theory in defense of its action fails to
definitively answer whether the swap was lawful.
55. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).
56. Press Release, supra note 13.
57. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009).
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B. The Constitutional Override Theory
The second theory used by the Administration to justify
the legality of the Bergdahl swap is its constitutional
override theory. Specifically, the Administration stated:
[i]f section 1035(d) were construed as applicable to the transfer, the
statute would be unconstitutional as applied because requiring 30
days’ notice of the transfer would have violated the constitutionallymandated separation of powers. Compliance with a 30 days’ notice
requirement in these circumstances would have “prevent[ed] the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions,” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988), without
being “justified by an overriding need” to promote legitimate
objectives of Congress, Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).58

In other words, the Administration argues that executive
branch power overrides the 30-day notice requirement in
situations such as the Bergdahl swap. This assertion of
executive power implicates the third category of the
executive-legislative power dynamic suggested by Justice
Jackson in his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.59 Category Three of Justice Jackson’s analysis
addresses situations where the President has taken action
that is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.”60 Jackson concludes that in such situations the
President’s power is at its “lowest ebb,” and the President
“can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”61
Although Jackson’s mathematical formulation is rather
straightforward, his analysis does not provide any guidance
on how to determine which presidential powers would
survive Category Three scrutiny.62 Therefore, a framework
58. Wittes, supra note 33.
59. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 638-40; William M. Hains, Comment, Challenging the Executive:
The Constitutionality of Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime
Detention Policies, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2283, 2293.
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must be identified to analyze the relevant executive and
legislative powers at play in the Bergdahl exchange and
ultimately determine the veracity of the Administration’s
override claim.
In determining that it had acted lawfully, the
Administration applied a framework from Morrison v. Olson
and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, whereby the
President’s constitutional prerogative is balanced against the
interests of Congress.63 In applying this framework, the
Administration concluded that:
Congress’s desire to have 30 days to weigh in on the determination
that the Secretary had already made, in accordance with criteria
specified by Congress, that the transfer did not pose the risks that
Congress was seeking to avoid, was not a sufficiently weighty
interest to justify this frustration of the Executive’s ability to carry
out these constitutionally assigned functions. 64

The Administration provided scant analysis to support
its assertion, and the relative ease with which its argument
dispatches with Congress’s restriction is an example of why
this separation of powers test has been dismissed as an
approach in “drawing a clear line between the President’s
Commander in Chief power and Congress’s war powers.”65 In
addition, this framework has been criticized for failing to
explain “why certain core executive powers . . . cannot be
infringed, even though it is generally understood that such
inviolable cores might exist,” and, therefore, “not actually
resolv[ing] the question that arises in a Youngstown
Category Three case.”66
For these reasons, the Administration’s separation of
powers approach fails to adequately assess its constitutional
override theory and, accordingly, a different framework must
63. Wittes, supra note 33 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988);
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
64. See Wittes, supra note 33.
65. Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between The Commander in Chief and Congress:
Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 406-07 (2008).
66. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121
HARV. L. REV. 689, 738 (2008) [hereinafter Framing the Problem].
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be used. Although there are many theories with which to
address the constitutional powers question at issue here,67
the “core/periphery” framework established by Professors
David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman allows for a
comprehensive
and
complete
assessment
of
the
68
Administration’s constitutional override theory.
This
framework relies on the understanding that the Constitution
affords the President “at least two types of constitutional
powers: those that he may exercise on his own but that are
regulable by statute, and those that form the ‘core’ . . . of the
Executive’s powers.”69 In other words, there are those powers
that the President may exercise absent congressional
authorization, or independent powers, and those powers
“that establish not only a power to act in the absence of
legislative authorization, but also an indefeasible scope of
discretion,” or preclusive powers.70 Furthermore, in
attempting to determine the extent of the President’s
preclusive wartime authority under this framework, Barron
and Lederman examined Supreme Court doctrine, foundingera views, historical practice of both the legislative and
executive branches, and a range of scholarly commentary.71
This Comment follows a similar analytical path.
Now that a framework to assess the Administration’s
override theory has been chosen, the issues to which it
applies must be defined. As the core/periphery framework
suggests, the President must have had preclusive power to
execute the Bergdahl exchange for the Administration’s
override theory to prove correct. Since the Administration
characterized the Bergdahl swap narrowly—“a timesensitive prisoner exchange designed to save the life of a U.S.
soldier”72—there are two questions worth addressing in the
67. For a discussion of alternative theories, see id. at 737-50.
68. Id. at 726.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally id.; David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander
in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941
(2008) [hereinafter A Constitutional History].
72. Wittes, supra note 33.
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context of the Administration’s override argument: (1) does
the President have preclusive authority over all prisoner of
war exchanges;73 and, if not, (2) does the President, at the
very least, have preclusive authority over prisoner of war
exchanges where a U.S. soldier’s life is in imminent danger?74
1. The President’s Authority over Prisoner of War
Exchanges
The debate over the extent of the President’s war powers
has been in full swing since the George W. Bush
Administration and its affirmation of broad presidential war
powers that asserted for the President near total exclusivity
in wartime decisions regardless of congressional legislation.75
Over the last several years, this articulation of the
President’s war powers has been called into question by
many scholars76 and has also been avoided by the Obama
Administration.77 If anything, the pendulum has swung in
the opposite direction. What was once considered
conventional wisdom, that Congress could not restrict dayto-day conduct of authorized military operations, is now met
with deep skepticism.78 However, although recent
examinations of historical and Supreme Court precedent
mostly conclude that Congress and the President have

73. As will be discussed below, this question involves the implication of a power
not expressly addressed by the Administration in its override rationale. However,
examination of this issue lays the groundwork for the overall constitutional
questions at issue here.
74. Though it could be argued that any potential prisoner of war exchange
where a U.S. soldier is held captive necessarily involves a threat to that soldier’s
life, based upon the Administration’s decision to color the Bergdahl situation as
a “unique circumstance[ ],” this Comment accepts a distinction between a prisoner
exchange where the executive branch has determined that there is an imminent
threat to a U.S. soldier’s life and one that does not. Wittes, supra note 33.
75. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 694; see also Frakt, supra note
24, at 233.
76. See, e.g., Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Hains, supra note 62; Lobel,
supra note 65.
77. Frakt, supra note 24, at 237.
78. See id. at 233-37.
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concurrent war powers,79 it is still generally accepted that
there remains a preclusive core to the President’s war
powers.80
With respect to the President’s authority over prisoner of
war exchanges, it is widely understood that such power
comes from the Commander in Chief clause.81 More
specifically, the President’s authority over wartime
detainees, and by corollary his authority over prisoner of war
exchanges, is an incidental power under the Commander in
Chief clause that activates following congressional
authorization of an armed conflict.82 In the context of the
Bergdahl exchange, the Authorization for Use of Military
Force of 2001 (“AUMF”)83 activated the President’s detention
authority over prisoners from the Afghan conflict.84 As such,
there is little doubt that, absent the 2014 NDAA, the

79. See, e.g., Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24; Hains,
supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65, at 463.
80. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 800 (finding the preclusive core
of the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority to include only that of
“superintendence”); Lobel, supra note 65, at 393 (concluding that “the only
Commander in Chief power that Congress cannot override is the President’s
power to command”).
81. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); Oona Hathaway et al., The
Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L.
123, 147-49 (2011).
82. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US. at 28; Hathaway et al., supra note 81; see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30).
83. See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF was passed by
Congress days after the September 11, 2001, attacks and signed by the President
shortly thereafter. It authorizes the President to:
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
Id.
84. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 731.
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President had the authority to exchange the five Taliban
prisoners for Bergdahl.
What is less clear, however, is whether the President’s
authority over prisoner of war exchanges via the Commander
in Chief clause is part of the preclusive core of presidential
war powers. As one might expect, there is no clear answer to
this question. The recent scholarship that has acknowledged
concurrent war powers between the executive and legislative
branches would likely argue that it is not part of the
preclusive core. For instance, multiple studies have
concluded that the only preclusive power provided by the
Commander in Chief clause is the power of
superintendence.85 Such determinations leave no room to
argue that the power to conduct prisoner of war exchanges is
preclusive, as it cannot be logically argued that the power is
somehow contained in the President’s hierarchal superiority
in the military chain of command. Furthermore, two other
commentators have specifically concluded that the
restrictions on the release of Guantanamo detainees placed
in various iterations of the NDAA are a constitutional
exercise of Congress’s concurrent war powers.86
However, such analyses do not completely disqualify the
override theory. With regard to detention authority, these
analyses focused solely on what authority, if any, Congress
had over wartime detainees.87 In particular, they were
concerned with certain transfer restrictions contained in
prior iterations of the NDAA as well as evaluating claims
made by the Bush Administration concerning its authority
over the treatment and disposition of detainees from the

85. See id. at 800; Lobel, supra note 65, at 393. Barron and Lederman describe
the power of superintendence as the President’s “control over the vast reservoirs
of military discretion that exist in every armed conflict, even when bounded by
important statutory limitations; and thus Congress may not assign such ultimate
decisionmaking discretion to anyone else (including subordinate military
officers).” Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 696-97.
86. Frakt, supra note 24, at 236-37; Hains, supra note 62, at 2283.
87. See generally Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24;
Hains, supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65.
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Afghan conflict.88 In concluding that Congress did have
concurrent authority over wartime detainees, these
commentators found the power in various sources, including
the Captures Clause, Law of Nations Clause, the Declare
War Clause, and the power of the purse.89 Clearly, these
analyses provide strong evidence that Congress has
concurrent authority over wartime detainees. In fact, the
Obama Administration has even acknowledged such
authority by accepting the general constitutionality of the
restrictions on Guantanamo detainees in the 2014 NDAA.90
However, none of the aforementioned analyses dealt
specifically with exchanging wartime detainees for an
American prisoner of war. The mere fact that Congress has
concurrent authority over wartime detainees does not itself
foreclose the potential that the more nuanced issue of
exchanging wartime detainees for a captive U.S. soldier lies
exclusively with the executive branch. Thus, while the 30-day
notice requirement in the 2014 NDAA may be constitutional
in general, recent scholarly work does not provide a definitive
answer as to whether it may be unconstitutional in situations
where Guantanamo detainees are exchanged for an
American prisoner of war, and, more generally, whether the
President has preclusive authority over all prisoner of war
exchanges.
A brief look at Supreme Court doctrine is similarly
unhelpful. In particular, “the Court has yet to resolve
definitively the precise contours of Congress’s powers to
control the President’s war powers.”91 Fairly recently, in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court seemingly reiterated
support for a somewhat broad preclusive core to the
President’s war powers when the majority quoted Chief
Justice Chase’s concurrence to Ex Parte Milligan to describe
88. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24; Hains,
supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65.
89. Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Hains, supra note 62.
90. Wittes, supra note 33 (“Thus, even though, as a general matter, Congress
had authority under its constitutional powers related to war and the military to
enact section 1035(d), that provision would have been unconstitutional to the
extent it applied to the unique circumstances of this transfer.”).
91. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766.
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the interplay between the President and Congress’s war
powers.92 In no small part, Chief Justice Chase noted,
“Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns.”93
However, in Hamdan, this acknowledgement came amidst a
decision where the Court found military commissions
established by the Bush Administration to try Guantanamo
detainees invalid in the face of a congressional restriction,
specifically the Uniform Code of Military Justice.94 Thus, the
potential acceptance of a broad preclusive core to the
President’s war powers placed in the context of the ultimate
decision in Hamdan ends up muddying the waters as to the
Court’s true belief.95 Other Court decisions related to Bush
Administration policies as well as past decisions unrelated to
the Afghan conflict provide similarly inconclusive
information as to the Court’s characterization of a preclusive
core.96 Thus, while the Court “surely has not ruled out the
modern consensus of war powers scholars that the President
does retain some, not fully specified, preclusive control,”97 its
decisions have simply not provided any insight into the
specific preclusive authority of the President and,
consequently, the President’s authority over prisoner of war
exchanges.
Since the Supreme Court offers precious little help at
coming to a conclusion on this issue, it is prudent to look at
historical practices concerning prisoner of war exchanges for
insight into how this power has been utilized in the past. In
all of the wars fought by the United States, there are only
two instances where Congress has sought to impose its will
on prisoner exchanges. The first occurred during the QuasiWar with France in the 1790s. During this conflict, Congress
passed several statutes regarding the taking of prisoners. 98
92. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591-92 (2006).
93. Id. at 592 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).
94. Id. at 620-25; see also Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766.
95. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766.
96. Id. at 761-67.
97. Id. at 766.
98. For a summary of these statutes’ provisions, see Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L.
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Of particular note, one statute provided that “the
President . . . is authorized to exchange or send away from
the United States to the dominions of France, as he may
deem proper and expedient, all French citizens that have
been or may be captured and brought into the United
States.”99 Another statute passed by Congress during this
time required the President “to cause the most rigorous
retaliation to be executed on any such citizens of the French
Republic, as have been or hereafter may be captured.”100
During the War of 1812, Congress passed similar provisions
indicating some inherent power over prisoners of war. In
particular, one statute authorized the President “to make
such regulations and arrangements for the safe keeping,
support and exchange of prisoners of war as he may deem
expedient.”101
There are two competing theories as to how one should
consider these statutes in terms of the executive-legislative
war powers debate. One commentator has argued that
Congress was simply trying to encourage the President to use
prisoners as bargaining chips, and since the statutes do not
place any substantive restrictions or requirements on the
President, they amount to nothing more than a symbolic
gesture.102 In contrast, another commentator reasoned that
early Congresses believed that the Constitution granted
Congress power over prisoner of war policy and, as such, they
were simply exercising that authority.103 Although both
arguments appear credible, in attempting to argue for a
preclusive presidential power over prisoner of war
exchanges, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Congress has
previously exercised at least some authority over prisoner of

REV. 299, 339-40 (2008); John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1183, 1206-10 (2004).
99. Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 624, 624 (emphasis added).
100. Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743, 743.
101. Act of July 6, 1812, ch. 128, 2 Stat. 777, 777, repealed by Act of Mar. 3,
1817, ch. 34, 3 Stat. 358 (emphasis added).
102. Yoo, supra note 98, at 1209.
103. Prakash, supra note 98, at 340.
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war policy.104 However, the significance of the laws passed
during the Quasi-War with France and the War of 1812
diminishes when one considers that:
in none of the major wars of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries in which U.S. detention operations are now concluded—
World Wars I and II; Korea and Vietnam; and the 1991 and 2003
Iraq Wars—has Congress imposed any such restriction [as the 2014
NDAA] on the exchange, transfer, or release of prisoners, during or
after the period of armed conflict.105

In fact, it could be argued, in the words of Justice
Frankfurter in his concurrence to Youngstown,106 that such
executive action coupled with congressional inaction with
regard to prisoner exchanges over the last two hundred years
should be “treated as a gloss on [E]xecutive Power vested in
the President,” as it embodies a “systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure
of our government.”107 One point, however, weighs heavily
against coming to such a conclusion. Specifically, Congress
likely avoided becoming entangled in prisoner of war matters
not because it is unconstitutional, but rather because it was
the pragmatic thing to do. As one commentator noted, “[i]t is
undisputed that as a general matter Congress should not
manage in detail military campaigns, and historically
Congress has not done so. . . . But Congress has the power to
do so, and political (not constitutional) considerations have
prevented Congress from doing so.”108

104. See id.
105. Deborah N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
625, 629 (2014); see also Yoo, supra note 98, at 1221 (“With the exception of the
statutes passed during the Quasi-War with France, and the War of 1812,
authorizing the President to take and retaliate against prisoners of war, Congress
has never sought to regulate the disposition of POWs or asserted that it has any
authority over them.”).
106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 610-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Lobel, supra note 65, at 415.
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In sum, recent scholarly work, Supreme Court doctrine,
and historical practice fail to provide a definitive answer to
the issue of whether the President has preclusive authority
over all prisoner of war exchanges. While there are strong
arguments that support concurrent war powers between
Congress and the President as well as clear historical
examples of Congress freely exercising some authority over
prisoner of war policy, there is simply not enough evidence to
be certain that preclusive executive authority over prisoner
of war exchanges does not exist. Likewise, however, this
sentiment prevents one from definitively concluding that the
Bergdahl exchange was a constitutional exercise of the
President’s general authority over prisoner of war exchanges.
2. The President’s Authority over Prisoner of War
Exchanges Involving Imminent Danger to a U.S.
Soldier’s Life
Perhaps the uncertainty regarding the extent of the
President’s authority over prisoner of war exchanges is why
the Obama Administration, as it did with its implied
exception argument, seems to rely solely on the President’s
constitutionally mandated “power to protect” to support its
constitutional override theory.109 The President’s power to
protect has long been recognized as an independent,
substantive power granted to the President as the Chief
Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces that
allows the President to take unilateral military action to
protect the lives of American citizens and U.S. soldiers
abroad.110 Therefore, on its face, the Administration can
readily justify the application of this power because the
Bergdahl swap took place in the context of Bergdahl’s
severely declining health, which allowed the Administration
to argue that abiding by the 30-day notice requirement would

109. Wittes, supra note 33.
110. SOLICITOR, DEP’T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES: MEMORANDUM OF THE SOLICITOR FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCT. 5, 1912, at 43 (2d ed. 1929) [hereinafter RIGHT TO
PROTECT CITIZENS].
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jeopardize Bergdahl’s life.111 Furthermore, as the previous
Section noted, the action taken by the President to effectuate
Bergdahl’s release, the exchange of five Taliban detainees,
was clearly within the President’s power in light of
congressional authorization for the Afghan conflict.112 Of
course, this power over wartime detainees was found to be
insufficient to decisively conclude that the President’s action
was lawful. Thus, the second question posed earlier is now at
hand: Does the President have preclusive authority over
prisoner of war exchanges where a U.S. soldier’s life is in
imminent danger? Or, more precisely, does the power to
protect grant the President an extremely narrow preclusive
power to transfer wartime detainees to save the life of a
captive U.S. soldier?
Supreme Court doctrine regarding the President’s power
to protect is somewhat ambiguous, but a few cases are worth
addressing. First, in The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court
recognized that a “privilege of a citizen of the United States
is to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government over his life, liberty, and property
when . . . within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.”113
Additionally, in In re Neagle, the Court articulated the
general idea that the Constitution provides the executive
branch an inherent power to protect.114 Specifically, in finding
that the Attorney General had lawfully assigned a U.S.
Marshal to protect a federal judge, the Court reasoned that
the President’s constitutional mandate to “take care that the
laws be faithfully executed” is not limited to “the enforcement
of acts of congress or of treaties of the United States
according to their express terms,” but necessarily includes
“the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the
Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the
protection implied by the nature of the government under the
111. See Wittes, supra note 33 (“[T]he Administration had determined that
providing notice as specified in the statute would undermine the Executive’s
efforts to protect the life of a U.S. soldier.”).
112. See supra Part III.B.1.
113. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
114. 135 U.S. 1, 67 (1890).
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Constitution.”115 However, the most express judicial
recognition of this power occurred outside of the Supreme
Court in Durand v. Hollins, an 1860 case from the Circuit
Court for the Southern District of New York.116 In upholding
presidential authority to order a naval commander to
bombard Greytown, Nicaragua in retaliation for a riot that
injured U.S. citizens, the court noted “as it respects the
interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of the
lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity,
rest in the discretion of the [P]resident.”117 Therefore, while
judicial doctrine does not establish the extent of the power to
protect American lives abroad, it clearly recognizes it as an
independent power of the President.118
To understand whether the power to protect is a
preclusive power, then, historical assertions of this power
should be examined. Although there is no example directly
on point, history is ripe with situations where the President
has taken unilateral military action pursuant to this
mandate.119 For instance, this power has been utilized at least
as far back as Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, when in 1805
he instructed military officers to protect U.S. citizens from
Spanish attacks despite lacking any express grant of
authority
from
Congress.120
More
recently,
the
administrations of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have all in

115. Id. at 64 (emphasis removed).
116. 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
117. Id. at 112.
118. See Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 142
(1993) (“[Durand] exemplifies judicial recognition of an early, longstanding
practice. No court has declared this authority a ‘constitutional fact,’ but it meets
the criteria of one.”).
119. Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the
Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama, 43
CUMB. L. REV. 375, 458 (2013).
120. RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS, supra note 110. This may not have even been
President Jefferson’s first assertion of this power. See Kelly, supra note 118, at
139-40.
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one form or another asserted the constitutional authority to
act unilaterally in protecting the lives of Americans abroad.121
Two of the more relevant examples come from the
Administrations of Presidents Ford and Carter. In 1975, at
the close of the Vietnam War, a number of U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals needed evacuation from South Vietnam and
Cambodia.122 However, “[s]tatutory limitations barring the
use of funds for the involvement of U.S. armed forces in
combat activities and hostilities in Southeast Asia arguably
prohibited the use of armed forces to rescue U.S. nationals
and foreigners.”123 After convening a joint session of Congress
to plead for clarification on the extent of the limitations,
President Ford took action without waiting for congressional
approval.124 He ordered U.S. troops to evacuate thousands of
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from both locations.125 Two
weeks later, Ford took similar unilateral action in ordering
U.S. troops to rescue the crew of a U.S. merchant ship, the
Mayaguez, which had been seized by Cambodia.126 Although
the Ford Administration did not explicitly refer to the
President’s power to protect in defense of its actions,
President Ford did “reference . . . both his inherent ‘executive
power and his authority as Commander in Chief.’” 127
Furthermore, the Ford Administration implied that the
powers it had utilized were preclusive.128

121. See Garrison, supra note 119, at 428-78 (discussing examples of such
assertions for each of these Presidents).
122. A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1072.
123. Id. at 1072 & n.530 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1073.
127. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 916 (1994) (quoting Text of President
Ford’s Report to Congress on Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1975, at 15).
128. See id. (“State Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh supported
President Ford’s claim and asserted that these inherent powers could not
constitutionally be restricted.”).
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The Carter Administration exercised similar executive
power in 1979, during the Iran hostage crisis.129 After Iranian
students had taken sixty-three members of the U.S. embassy
hostage, the Carter Administration used the President’s
constitutional obligation to protect American lives to justify
several operations in an attempt to save the hostages.130
Notably, the Carter Administration asserted this power to
override congressional notification requirements in two
different statutes.131
The actions of both the Ford and Carter Administrations
are the closest scenarios to the Bergdahl exchange that
provide some evidence that the power to protect is part of the
preclusive core of executive war powers. One important
difference between them, however, is that the actions of the
Ford and Carter Administrations involved deploying troops
in attempts to save the lives of American citizens and
soldiers, while the Bergdahl exchange involved the release of
wartime detainees to protect Bergdahl’s life. Thus, it is
important to square the two uses of authority. The
President’s power to deploy troops absent congressional
authorization pursuant to the power to protect is clearly
established, and this exercise of authority is understood as
deriving from the Commander in Chief clause.132 Similarly,
the President’s authority over wartime detainees also comes
from the Commander in Chief clause—with the added caveat
129. Garrison, supra note 119, at 433.
130. Id.
131. See Geoffrey Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A
Proposal to Reconcile Constitutional Practice with Operational Reality, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 687, 732 (2010) (noting that the Carter Administration did not
believe it needed to abide by the notification requirement in the War Powers
Resolution); Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair: Was
Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 83, 123-24, 113 n.111 (1988)
(noting that the Carter Administration did not abide by the “timely” notification
requirement of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947); Cyrus R. Vance,
Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1984) (“There were those in the [Carter]
administration who favored consulting congressional leaders in accordance with
section 3 of the War Powers Resolution before our units were set in motion.
However, concerns for secrecy prevailed.”).
132. See Kelly, supra note 118 (“Congress generally concedes that the
Commander-in-Chief clause includes this independent power.”).
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that congressional authorization must activate that power.133
Here, because the AUMF activated the President’s authority
over the five Taliban detainees, his decision to release them
requires no further grant of authority than did the
deployment of troops by the Ford and Carter Administrations
in the situations discussed above. Thus, one could argue that,
like the Ford and Carter Administrations’ deployment of
troops in contravention of established law, the release of the
five Taliban detainees without following the 2014 NDAA’s
30-day notice requirement was a valid exercise of the
President’s preclusive authority to protect American citizens
and U.S. soldiers abroad.
The Administration’s constitutional override theory
appears to have some promising weight to it. However, the
idea that the actions of the Ford and Carter Administrations
were exercises of preclusive authority is not without its
critics. For instance, while acknowledging the significance of
President Ford’s exercise of power in the evacuation and
rescue in Vietnam and Cambodia, two commentators
characterized the situation as an exception to historical
presidential action and still concluded that the only
preclusive core to the President’s war powers was the power
of superintendence.134 Furthermore, Ford’s actions were
criticized by “then-Assistant Senate Legal Counsel Glennon,
who had argued that the funding restrictions prohibited the
evacuations and Mayaguez operations, [and] asserted that
‘[t]he power of the President to commit the armed forces to
hostilities is subordinate to the power of the Congress to deny
funds.’”135 Finally, in discussing the protective power of the
presidency generally, another commentator acknowledged
that while a President’s authority to act in a true emergency
is a question that has existed since the founding, “no

133. See supra Part III.B.1.
134. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 800; A Constitutional History,
supra note 71.
135. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 127, at 917 (quoting Letter from
Michael J. Glennon to Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (May 4, 1976), in 3 MICHAEL J.
GLENNON & THOMAS M. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 368, 368
(1981)).
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presidential authority to act contra legem exists.”136
Therefore, while the Obama Administration’s use of the
power to protect to justify the Bergdahl swap does not appear
unprecedented, arguments against this theory persist and,
accordingly, definitive preclusive authority in this situation
remains elusive.
C. Conclusion
The Obama Administration proffered two distinct legal
theories in defense of its decision to ignore the 2014 NDAA’s
30-day notice requirement in executing the Bergdahl
exchange. Its statutory, implied exception theory argued for
a narrow construction of the notice requirement that
excepted situations such as the Bergdahl swap. On the other
hand, its constitutional override theory asserted that the
notice requirement was unconstitutional in circumstances
where it might impinge on the President’s constitutional
mandate to protect the lives of American citizens and
soldiers. An examination of these two theories revealed that,
while both are colorable arguments, neither one provides the
sort of definitive authority necessary to determine whether
the Obama Administration’s action was lawful.
Notably, a genuine answer to this question is unlikely to
surface. First, neither Congress nor the President is likely to
take any definitive action surrounding this issue. While the
executive branch will no doubt continue to write legal
opinions while Congress holds hearings and conducts
investigations, history has shown that the stalemate
surrounding this type of authority will not break.
Additionally, the courts are unlikely to ever hear a case of
this kind.137 There will never be any litigation pertaining to
the Administration’s conduct in the Bergdahl exchange
because the injuries are not personal and therefore “not
136. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1993).
137. Jack Goldsmith, One or Two Other Statutes the President Likely
Disregarded in The Bergdahl Deal, LAWFARE BLOG (June 2, 2014, 7:45 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/one-or-two-other-statutes-the-presidentlikely-disregarded-in-the-bergdahl-deal.
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sufficient for standing.”138 Specifically, releasing inmates
from Guantanamo does not harm a specific person, and
though it is feasible to argue that the public at-large is
somehow injured, that alone is insufficient.139 Although there
is a case currently before the D.C. Circuit that argues, among
other things, that the transfer restrictions on Guantanamo
detainees are an unconstitutional impingement of the
President’s Commander in Chief power, the prospects for the
case are not promising.140 For one, the trial court dismissed
the original case for lack of standing.141 Furthermore, time
and again courts have refused to “resolve definitively the
precise contours of Congress’s power to control the
President’s war powers.”142 Thus, even if this case is heard on
the merits, it is hard to believe that any ruling as to that
particular argument is forthcoming.
Clarity on this subject will continue to be elusive, an
unsettling reality because the question directly affects the
life of any U.S. soldier taken captive. Therefore, it is
incredibly important to provide a definitive answer to the
constitutional question at issue—not just for the soldiers that
we are sending off to war in increasingly non-traditional
circumstances, but also for the public and our political
leaders. The final Part of this Comment proposes a solution
to this problem by arguing that important policy
considerations necessitate the recognition of exclusive
presidential authority over prisoner of war exchanges.
IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO
CONDUCT PRISONER OF WAR EXCHANGES
As this Comment has shown, there is simply no definitive
answer to the legal question implicated by the Bergdahl
138. Zack Beauchamp, A New Report Says Obama’s Bowe Bergdahl Prisoner
Swap Was Illegal. Here’s What It Missed, VOX (Aug. 21, 2014, 5:32 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/9/5786834/obama-law-bergdahl (quoting University
of Chicago Law Professor Eric Posner).
139. Id.
140. Ahjam v. Obama, 37 F. Supp. 3d 273 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed,
No. 14-5116 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
141. Id. at 277.
142. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766.
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swap. However, the political and public uproar following the
exchange demonstrates that providing such an answer is of
considerable importance. Accordingly, this Comment
suggests that policy concerns warrant the recognition of an
exclusive authority for the executive branch to perform
prisoner of war exchanges. There are three major policy
concerns that are relevant in arriving at this conclusion: (1)
concerns that granting this limited power could lead to a grab
for more expansive wartime power by the President; (2) the
potential that unilateral decision making in this context may
lead to undesirable or even dangerous results; and (3) the
military ethos to never leave a soldier behind.
A. Expanding Executive Power
There is a valid concern that congressional and judicial
acquiescence to presidential authority in this narrow context
could bleed over into more expansive wartime powers. For
instance, some commentators have expressed concerns over
the Supreme Court ever expressly acknowledging preclusive
wartime authority for the executive branch because of the
potential for a President to use it to justify expansive powers
akin to those asserted by the Bush Administration.143
However, such concerns seem unwarranted in the context of
a narrowly tailored power that gives the President the
authority to exchange enemy combatants captured during an
armed conflict for a U.S. soldier taken captive during that
conflict. In particular, such a power does not impliedly give
the President the exclusive authority to set wartime
detention policies, nor does it run the risk of justifying
detainee abuse.144 By simply accepting this narrow, exclusive
authority in the President, the legislature and judiciary
provide no statutes or legal opinions to interpret nor any
constitutional powers to balance. There is no doubt that
creative legal minds in the executive branch could challenge
this seemingly straightforward authority. However, the only
obviously arguable facts would be whether the detainee(s)
and the exchanged-for soldier(s) were taken captive during
143. A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1106-07.
144. These were two major concerns that arose as a result of the Bush
Administration’s legal philosophies. See id. at 1110-11.
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the same conflict. That determination is a more difficult
question than it may initially seem considering the
complexities of the global war on terror, but not an impossible
task. Such a rule would apply only to soldiers (as opposed to
civilians) taken captive during an identifiable conflict—a
qualification that necessarily restricts where and by whom a
soldier could be taken captive.145
Other issues raised along with this concern include the
contention that Congress’s participation in the process helps
to legitimize it146 and prevents errors in judgment by the
President.147 While such points are valid, the type of
considered, drawn-out debate that Congress provides is not
suited to time-sensitive prisoner exchanges, such as the
Bergdahl swap. Furthermore, when more time is available,
there is no reason to believe that the executive branch would
be any more prone to making an unwise or hasty decision
than Congress. In fact, leaving the decision solely up to the
President allows him or her to face any public or political
scrutiny on his or her own, while preventing any political
games from being played with an American soldier still in
enemy hands. The idea that the President and Congress
could play politics to the detriment of a captive U.S. soldier
is not far-fetched considering the hyper-partisan
environment in Washington.148 While there is certainly a
traditional influence that a President carries during
wartime,149 the expansive power wielded by the Bush
Administration and constant calls of executive overreach
leveled against the Obama Administration may have
withered that influence away. In the end, the concern that a
limited grant of preclusive power in this context could bleed
145. While this leaves open the possibility that special operators taken captive
during covert activities not associated with a more overt conflict would slip
through the cracks of this authority, such circumstances implicate a different set
of policy issues than those addressed here.
146. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 413-14.
147. A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1110.
148. One need only look at the flip-flopping reaction of several congressmen
following the Bergdahl swap to illustrate this point. See Catalina Camia, Oops!
Praise for Sgt. Bergdahl Tops Deleted Tweets by Politicians, USA TODAY: ON
POLITICS (Dec. 31, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/12/31/
twitter-bergdahl-deleted-sunlight-foundation.
149. See, e.g., A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1109.
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over into more expansive powers is insufficient on its own to
discourage recognizing such authority.
B. Potential for Disproportionate or Dangerous Results
A second policy concern that is relevant in examining
whether an exclusive executive power over prisoner of war
exchanges should be recognized is the potential for
disproportionate or dangerous results. In particular, two
major criticisms that have been leveled at the Obama
Administration regarding the Bergdahl exchange are that
the President negotiated with terrorists and that the price of
five Taliban detainees for one U.S. soldier was too high.150
However, a reasoned look at these criticisms only serves to
demonstrate the type of political squabbling that can occur
with a soldier’s life in the balance. First, regarding the
concern that the Administration paid too high a price, a brief
look at past prisoner exchanges reveals that disproportionate
results are a rather common occurrence. For example, in
1953, 6670 Communist prisoners were exchanged for only
684 UN-affiliated personnel as the Korean War was winding
down.151 In this instance, despite intense political and public
debate surrounding the disposition of war prisoners,
Congress passed no laws and the exchange was handled by
executive agreement.152 Additionally, in 1973, the Paris
Accords that ended the U.S. conflict in Vietnam “brought 591
Americans back home, including now-Sen. John McCain, in
exchange for the release of 2,600 NVA soldiers.”153 Finally, in
a more recent example not involving the United States,
longtime ally Israel traded 1027 Palestinian prisoners for one
Israeli soldier.154 Thus, it is safe to conclude that criticisms of
the “5 for 1” Bergdahl swap are somewhat overstated.
150. Ed Payne & Tom Cohen, Hagel on Bergdahl Deal: “We Could Have Done a
Better Job” of Informing Congress, CNN (June 13, 2014, 8:36 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/12/politics/bowe-bergdahl-release/index.html.
151. Pearlstein, supra note 105, at 646.
152. Id.
153. Dan Lamothe, And You Thought 5-for-1 Was Lopsided? The Bowe Bergdahl
Deal, Visually Compared, WASH. POST: CHECKPOINT (June 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/09/and-youthought-5-for-1-was-lopsided-the-bowe-bergdahl-deal-visually-compared.
154. Id.
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Importantly, however, these examples are not intended to
justify or legitimize the Bergdahl swap, as that question is
correctly left to political and public debate. Instead, they are
meant to put this particular criticism into perspective and
show that disparate results in prisoner exchanges are a wellestablished cost of war. As such, this concern should not
weigh heavily against recognizing exclusive executive power
in this arena.
Another criticism pertaining to the cost of the Bergdahl
exchange involves the dangerousness of the released Taliban
detainees and the concern that they could re-engage in
militant activities.155 While this apprehension is
understandable,156 it is not unique to the Bergdahl exchange.
As one commentator notes:
The notion of returning prisoners to a homeland of violent political
instability, for example, is not new. We returned prisoners twice to
post-war European nations whose economic, political, and state
security systems had been decimated by what were then the most
destructive wars history had ever known. Neither is it the case that
we would never release prisoners who still harbor violent intentions
toward the United States. In World War II, among the first
prisoners released were those Nazis whose enmity was “most
hardened” against us. Nor can it be contended that we would never
release prisoners as long as they have ideological brethren with
whom they might again affiliate in re-engaging the fight. We
returned thousands of communist prisoners to communist
nations—for a half-century our most feared, most hated ideological
opponents—at the height of a half-century long war that was “hot”
(in Korea and Vietnam) almost as often as it was cold, and that was
defined by the standing deployment of U.S. armed forces to
countries all over the world.157

The United States has also not differentiated state from
non-state enemies in the exchange of prisoners.158 During the
Vietnam War, the U.S. unilaterally released Viet Cong
155. Payne & Cohen, supra note 150.
156. See Dan Lamothe, Taliban Official Swapped For Bowe Bergdahl Could
Return to Battlefield, General Says, WASH. POST: CHECKPOINT (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/02/03/taliban-officialswapped-for-bowe-bergdahl-could-return-to-battlefield-general-says.
157. Pearlstein, supra note 105, at 664-65.
158. Id. at 665.
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prisoners with the hope that it would inspire better
treatment of our soldiers taken captive.159 Additionally,
during the Civil War, the President “negotiated terms for the
exchange of civilian prisoners captured by the Union army
during military operations.”160 Again, such examples are not
meant to lend merit to the Bergdahl swap, but simply offer
further perspective of the critique that there is something
wholly different about current detainees that requires
congressional oversight.
The final criticism that implicates the potential for
undesired results should exclusive presidential authority
over prisoner exchanges be recognized is the claim that the
President broke a central foreign policy directive to not
negotiate with terrorists.161 Because of the unique facts
surrounding Bergdahl’s capture and subsequent release, this
claim is a little murky. However, it has been one of the most
consistent critiques of the swap. The main issue concerns
Bergdahl’s initial disappearance. In particular, the Taliban
captured Bergdahl after he left his unit’s outpost.162 Then,
shortly after that initial capture, it is widely believed that the
Taliban transferred Bergdahl into the control of the Haqqani
network.163 After this transfer, Bergdahl likely spent the
majority of his captivity under Haqqani control in northwest
Pakistan.164
The uncertainty about Bergdahl’s whereabouts during
his captivity drives much of the argument in favor of this
claim. Specifically, while the Taliban is not considered a
terrorist organization by the U.S. government, the Haqqani
network is.165 What further muddies the waters of this claim
is that the deal for Bergdahl was brokered directly with
159. Id.; Yoo, supra note 98, at 1220-21.
160. Yoo, supra note 98, at 1222 n.167.
161. Michael Crowley, Obama Didn’t Negotiate With ‘Terrorists’ for Bergdahl,
TIME (June 2, 2014), http://time.com/2809612/bowe-bergdahl-obama-taliban.
162. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/
ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
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Qatar, a recognized sovereign nation.166 In short, those who
choose to believe that the Administration negotiated with
terrorists have a point; especially when considering that
Bergdahl was primarily held by a well-known terrorist
organization. However, it is also not a stretch to characterize
the exchange as a fairly standard prisoner of war negotiation
with a non-state enemy force.167
Even if one believes that the Administration violated the
foreign policy directive to not negotiate with terrorists, a look
at past practice again undermines this critique. For instance,
the federal government has negotiated with terrorist
organizations as far back as 1784 when Congress
appropriated about $80,000 as tribute to the Barbary nations
to prevent pirate attacks on U.S. ships.168 The Carter
Administration engaged in negotiations with Iranians, who
took Americans hostage in Iran, and achieved their release
only after unfreezing about $11 billion in assets.169 President
Reagan notoriously traded arms to the Iranians to secure the
release of Americans held in Lebanon,170 while President
Clinton met with Gerry Adams of the Irish Republican Army,
an organization that, at the time, was on the State
Department’s terror list.171 Finally, the Bush Administration
cut deals with Sunni insurgents in Iraq’s Anbar province,
working with and paying people who had been killing
American soldiers.172 This is not to condone any of these
actions nor debate the relative merits of negotiating with
unsavory organizations. However, to criticize the
Administration’s action in this instance as violating some
sacred principle is disingenuous. Furthermore, to use it as a
reason against recognizing exclusive executive power over
prisoner exchanges—while making for an attention grabbing
166. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1.
167. Entous & Barnes, supra note 9.
168. Kurt Eichenwald, The Truth Behind the Bowe Bergdahl POW Prisoner
Swap, NEWSWEEK (June 3, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/truthbehind-bowe-bergdahl-pow-prisoner-swap-253218.
169. Crowley, supra note 161.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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headline—only serves to distract from the group that serves
to benefit the most, captive U.S. soldiers.
C. The Military Ethos to Leave No Soldier Behind
While the above policy concerns may cause some to
question the wisdom of recognizing exclusive executive
authority over prisoner of war exchanges, the military ethos
to leave no one behind should put those concerns to rest. The
President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
bears this obligation to all of those under his command. It is
a sacred principle that American service members hold
dear,173 and it is irresponsible to send troops into battle
without a clear understanding of what steps will be taken to
ensure they are not left behind. The most direct way of doing
so is to give the Commander in Chief a clear mandate over
all prisoner exchanges, thus enabling him or her to take
swift, unilateral action when circumstances require it.
Although the Bergdahl case comes with the emotionally
charged element of his alleged desertion, this authority must
exist regardless of the circumstances surrounding the service
member’s capture. It would be unwise to allow this fact to
condition the President’s exclusive authority to negotiate for
service members’ release. Specifically, there are any number
of circumstances that could call a service members’ capture
into question and require a legal review.174 John Bellinger, a
former State Department lawyer under President George W.
Bush, may have put this controversial issue best when he
said, “[w]e don’t leave soldiers on the battle field under any
circumstance unless they have actually joined the enemy
army . . . [Bergdahl] was a young 20-year-old. Young 20-yearolds make stupid decisions. . . . [I]f you make a stupid
decision [we do not] leave you in the hands of the Taliban.”175
173. Eric Schmitt et al., Critics Are Questioning American Military Credo of
Leaving No One Behind, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/04/world/critics-questioning-credo-of-leaving-no-one-behind.html?_r=2.
174. See 10 U.S.C. § 899 (2012) (“cowardly conduct”); § 911 (“reckless operation
of a vehicle”); § 913 (“sleeping upon his post”).
175. Schmitt et al., supra note 173; see also Ryan Goodman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Bergdahl Exchange Vital to Keeping Faith with American Service Members, JUST
SECURITY (June 11, 2014, 10:39 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/12788/joint-
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The then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Martin Dempsey, and the Secretary of the Army, John
McHugh, as well as many other military officials, agree with
this sentiment.176 While there is no doubt that Bergdahl
should face military justice if he did, in fact, desert, 177 a solid
prisoner of war policy should rest on the non-partisan legal
principle that, like any other American citizen and soldier in
the armed forces, one is entitled to the presumption of
innocence. Granting the President unilateral authority to
secure a soldier’s release does not and should not affect any
eventual adjudication process.
Finally, also relevant to this discussion is that soldiers
are being sent into increasingly unconventional conflicts.
Except for the first Gulf War and the initial invasion in Iraq,
the United States military has not fought a traditional, largescale conflict with another nation-state in decades.178
Accordingly, the era of large, traditionally negotiated
prisoner exchanges that were commonplace in the major
wars of the past are, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to
take place. What is more probable is that non-state enemies
that provide, at best, uncertain captivity conditions will take
smaller numbers of our soldiers captive. This sets up
circumstances that will more likely than not replicate those
of the Bergdahl swap, where a drawn-out congressional
debate and the inevitable political squabbling that goes along
with it could work to the detriment of a captive soldier.

chiefs-staff-bergdahl-exchange-vital-keeping-faith-american-service-members.
In addition, Department of Defense policy for retrieving missing soldiers does not
differentiate between deserters and non-deserters. See Timothy Matthews, Sgt.
Bergdahl and the High Priority to Recover Missing Soldiers, JUST SECURITY (June
9, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://justsecurity.org/11384/guest-post-sgt-bergdahl-highpriority-recover-missing-soldiers.
176. Id.
177. See Dan Lamothe, Army Sets Court Date in Desertion Case Against Bowe
Bergdahl, WASH. POST: CHECKPOINT (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/04/02/army-sets-court-date-in-desertion-caseagainst-bowe-bergdahl.
178. See ROBERT M. GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY AT WAR 209 (2014)
(“American use of military force since Vietnam—with the sole exceptions of the
Gulf War and the first weeks of the Iraq War—had involved unconventional
conflicts against smaller states or nonstate entities . . . .”).
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D. Conclusion
The focus of prisoner of war exchanges should not be on
devising creative legal arguments used to justify the actions,
but on doing what is necessary to bring captive soldiers home.
The uproar following the Bergdahl exchange included several
scathing critiques that provide salient policy concerns
relevant to the proposed solution of recognizing exclusive
executive authority over prisoner exchanges. However, an
examination of these concerns, including the potential
expansion of presidential wartime powers and the fear of
undesirable or even dangerous results, demonstrates that
they are mostly overstated and represent, at best, politicians
playing political games with soldiers’ lives, and, at worst, a
precursor to more restrictive conditions on future exchanges.
Granting the executive branch exclusive authority to make
prisoner exchanges removes the threat of potentially
dangerous congressional restrictions, prevents critics from
arguing that the President has broken the law by negotiating
for the release of a U.S. soldier, and tempers the ability of
politicians to use our captive soldiers to score political points.
Furthermore, the military ethos to leave no soldier behind
represents a meaningful policy that deserves some authority.
Simply put, that ethos should stand for the principle that our
soldiers can go off to war believing that their Commander in
Chief has the authority to negotiate their release without the
fear of restrictive laws standing in the way.
CONCLUSION
When President Obama announced the recovery of Sgt.
Bowe Bergdahl from the Taliban in exchange for five Taliban
detainees, a public and political uproar ensued. While the
emotionally charged element of Bergdahl’s alleged desertion
stirred a fair amount of anger, the bulk of the criticism
leveled at the Administration consisted of policy concerns
and the Administration’s disregard of the 30-day
congressional notice requirement contained in the 2014
NDAA. As this Comment has shown, the question of whether
the Administration actually broke the law is incredibly
difficult to answer. Although recent scholarship has
reimagined the structure of executive and legislative war
powers, there is no doubt that some preclusive core to the
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President’s wartime authority still exists. However, a precise
definition of those powers is elusive, and even the recognition
of a narrow authority to conduct a prisoner exchange to save
the life of a captive U.S. soldier is unclear.
To bring clarity to this issue and to prevent a President
from having to choose between a captive soldier’s life and a
constitutionally questionable law, Congress and the judiciary
should recognize exclusive authority for the President to
negotiate prisoner of war exchanges. The recognition of such
power is not without its concerns, but the overriding need to
keep the political branches from engaging in a futile dispute
over constitutional authority in this arena compels the
recognition of such power. Doing so will provide the President
with the flexibility to deal with prisoner exchanges in
unconventional circumstances and ensure our soldiers can go
off to war under any context knowing their Commander in
Chief has the authority to make every effort to bring them
home.

